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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No.  19-1495 
________________ 
 
ALLEN L. FEINGOLD,  
                                      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRADLEY & KENNY BROOKS; BRADLEY & DOYLE BROOKS; 
DANIEL DOYLE; ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
AKA ALLSTATE; MICHAEL RAITH 
                              
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-19-cv-00291) 
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 13, 2019 
 
Before: JORDAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 24, 2020) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Allen L. Feingold appeals the trial court’s decision to sua sponte dismiss his 
complaint as time-barred. In 2019, Feingold, a disbarred attorney, filed a bad faith claim 
against an insurance company, its lawyer, and an arbitrator (collectively, the “underlying 
defendants”), which was assigned to him by a former client, Kristina Edwards. J.A. A-2. 
The factual underpinning of this claim stems from conduct by the underlying defendants 
in failing to “fully or properly comply with the law, case law[,] or the Allstate Insurance 
Policy” during litigation of Edwards’s claim sometime between 2000 and 2011, when it 
was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Joint Appendix B-5 ¶ 28; J.A. A-2–4. Upon 
receiving Feingold’s complaint, the trial court granted Feingold’s petition to proceed in 
forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and sua sponte dismissed the matter as time-
barred. 
Feingold appealed and raises two issues for our consideration: (1) whether a trial 
court, acting under the mandates of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, may sua sponte dismiss a claim as 
time-barred and (2) whether the trial court correctly dismissed Feingold’s claim. We find 
the trial court had the authority to sua sponte dismiss the matter and was correct in doing 
so. We will affirm.1 
                                              
1 The trial court possessed jurisdiction over the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as there 
was complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeded 
$75,000. We possess jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as the trial 
court dismissed Mr. Feingold’s case with prejudice. We review the trial court’s decision 
de novo. Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the standard 
of review for a 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) dismissal is plenary) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
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 We must first determine whether a trial court may sue sponte dismiss a time-
barred claim under the screening process mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for litigants 
proceeding in forma pauperis. In Jones v. Bock, the Supreme Court considered whether 
amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 
altered the pleading standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 549 U.S. 199, 211 
(2007). In deciding the PLRA did not alter the pleading rules—and did not require a 
plaintiff to show exhaustion in his or her complaint—the Court stated screening for 
failure to state a claim could include considering the merits of an affirmative defense—
even if waivable—as long as it was apparent on the face of the complaint: 
A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the 
allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. If the 
allegations, for example, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a 
claim; that does not make the statute of limitations any less an affirmative 
defense, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). 
Id. at 214–15 (emphasis added). Notably, this was not premised upon the right of an 
individual proceeding in forma pauperis to comment upon the issue, as Feingold here 
argues.2 Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it sua sponte considered whether 
Feingold’s case was time-barred. 
 Because it is permissible for a trial court to dismiss a claim as time-barred upon a 
sua sponte screening under § 1915, we need now only consider whether the trial court 
                                              
2 Feingold’s citations to Lassiter v. City of Philadelphia, 716 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 2013) and 
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010) are 
inapposite. These cases do not involve § 1915, which requires a trial court to conduct a 
sua sponte screening of a complaint before it is served upon the defendants and thus do 
not address the issue currently before us. 
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correctly dismissed the claim. The Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a bad faith 
claim is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371; Ash v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 877, 885 
(Pa. 2007). The actionable conduct alleged to have caused the injuries here occurred, at 
the latest, in 2011 when the original matter was dismissed for failure to prosecute. J.A. 
B-5 ¶¶ 22-29; Edwards v. Guinta, No. 3084, 2011 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 302 (Pa. 
Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 17, 2011) (denying Edwards’s petition to open case after failed 
arbitration). See Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 224–25 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“In general, the statute of limitations begins to run when a right to institute . . . suit 
arises.”). Because Feingold did not file this action until 2019, it was not filed within the 
limitations period. 
Feingold presents two arguments as to why the trial court was incorrect: (1) the 
actionable conduct was not discovered until a period sometime within the limitations 
period, or (2) there exists a continuing breach of the underlying defendants’ obligations 
placing this action within the statute of limitations. But Feingold’s complaint centers on 
litigation conduct that he or his former client witnessed. J.A. B-5 ¶¶ 22-29. He knew, or 
should have known, of this conduct at the time it occurred. The trial court correctly 
determined the discovery rule would not toll the statute of limitations here. See Fine v. 
Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858–59 (Pa. 2005) (“Where, however, reasonable minds would 
not differ in finding that a party knew or should have known on the exercise of 
reasonable diligence of his injury and its cause, the court determines that the discovery 
rule does not apply as a matter of law.”). As to a continuing breach, in Pennsylvania, the 
statute of limitations runs when the first denial occurs, but continuing or subsequent 
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denials do not newly trigger the statute of limitations. See Sikirica, 416 F.3d at 225 
(citing Adamski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 738 A.2d 1033, 1037–38, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1999)). Feingold’s complaint of a continued denial therefore does not allow him to sue 
now for conduct that originally occurred in 2011. 
We will affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Feingold’s bad faith claim. 
